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Criminal Procedure-Illinois v. Gates: A New Test for
Informers' Tips
In what circumstances will an informer's tip to police furnish probable
cause for a search? In the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court, in Agu/ar
v. Texas' and Spine//i v. United States,2 established a "two-pronged test' 3 for
determining the presence of probable cause. In the recent case of Illinois v.
Gates,4 however, the Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spineli test and
adopted a "totality of the circumstances" standard, which the Court felt would
"better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the
Fourth Amendment requires." 5 The Gates decision has far-reaching implica-
tions for the future course of fourth amendment6 jurisprudence, for it loosens
the probable cause standard and thus decreases the likelihood that evidence
seized pursuant to an informer's tip will be excluded from use at trial.
To understand Illinois v. Gates, it is necessary to understand the Aguilar-
Spinelli test. The test traditionally is stated as having two prongs, a veracity
prong and a basis of knowledge prong.7 The veracity prong requires a showing
that the informant should be believed-that he is a credible person or that his
information is reliable.8 The basis of knowledge prong requires that the tip
1. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
2. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
3. Id at 413.
4. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
5. Id. at 2332.
6. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
7. InAguilar the Supreme Court held insufficient an affidavit which stated that "[affliants
have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that [narcotics and other
drugs] are being kept at the above described premises." Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 109. Justice
Goldberg, writing for the majority, stated that: "[tihe magistrate must be informed of some of the
underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded
that the informant. . . was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.' "Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
These two separate requirements are generally referred to as the two-pronged test of Aguilar.
The two-pronged test has generated a vast amount of commentary. The most illuminating
sources are LaFave, Probable Cause from Informants: The Effects of Murphy's Law on Fourth
Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1, and Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An
Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974). Professor LaFave's article is sub-
stantially reproduced in W. LAFAvE, I SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3 (1978). See also Livermore,
The Draper-Spinelli Problem, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 945 (1979); Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and
the Fourth Amendment: A Searchfor M4eaningful Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703 (1972); Comment,
Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Probable Cause: Reconciling the Spinelli/Draper Dichototny
in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99 (1982); Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause
for Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 958 (1969); Note, Probable Cause and the First-Tile
Informer, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 357 (1972).
8. The veracity prong serves the same purpose as the oath required of an officer presenting
first-hand facts as the basis for a warrant. Moylan, supra note 7, at 751. Because the officer gives
his information under oath, no independent inquiry into his credibility is needed. When the of-
ficer reports an informant's tip in an affidavit, however, the informant's information is hearsay.
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reveal some of the underlying circumstances from which the informer has con-
cluded that evidence of illegal activity is where he says it is.9 A tip insufficient
on its face to support a finding of probable cause may be buttressed by police
corroboration, but the partially corroborated tip must be "as reliable as one
which passes Aguilar's requirements when standing alone."' 0
The veracity prong most often was satisfied by a statement that the in-
formant had provided accurate information in the past,"I but could also be
satisfied by police corroboration of details of the tip, ' 2 or by the inherent relia-
bility of the source. 13 The basis of knowledge prong was satisfied most easily
by statements of first-hand experience (as when the informer states that he has
seen drugs at a certain location),' 4 but could also be satisfied by an abundance
of detail in the tip, from which the magistrate could infer that the informer
must have acquired his information in a reliable way.' 5
Because it is not given under oath, the veracity of the hearsay must be established before it may
form the basis of a finding of probable cause.
The veracity prong is sometimes characterized as having two "spurs"-a credibility spur and
a reliability spur. See Moylan, supra note 7, at 757-65. This distinction refers to the two ways in
which an informer's veracity may be established--either by demonstrating his credibility in prior
cases or his reliability in the present case.
9. The basis of knowledge prong is merely an extension of the general principle that, when-
ever possible, the probable cause determination should be made by a neutral arbiter, and that an
officer's conclusory statements are insufficient to support a warrant. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948), holding that inferences from evidence should be "drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime." Id. at 13-14. The officer must set out the facts from which he has
drawn his conclusions, so that the magistrate can judge the validity of those conclusions. See
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); see also Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971). If an officer's conclusory statement is forbidden, it follows that an informer's bare conclu-
sion should also be rejected. See Moylan, supra note 7, at 751. The informer's tip must provide
sufficient information about his basis of knowledge to allow the magistrate properly to exercise his
constitutional function.
10. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416. In Spinelli the police received a tip from a "confidential reliable
informant" that defendant was conducting an illegal bookmaking operation. The tip failed to
satisfy either prong of theAguilar test, as it revealed nothing about the informant's basis of knowl-
edge and contained no information about the conclusory statement that he was reliable. The tip
and results of an independent police investigation were presented together to a magistrate, who
then issued a search warrant. The Supreme Court ruled that the tip should be evaluated in light of
such additional information. Id. at 416. Even when considered in light of the additional evi-
dence, however, the Court found thatAguilar's requirements had not been satisfied. Id. at 417-18.
11. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); see generally LaFave, supra note 7, at
10.
12. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 427 (White, J., concurring) ("[B]ecause an informant is right
about some things, he is more probably right about other facts.").
13. See Moylan, supra note 7, at 765 (discussion of the "citizen-informer"). The ordinary
citizen is presumed more reliable than the regular police informer, who usually is a criminal him-
self or is from the criminal milieu. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 599 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The Harris case also established that the veracity prong may be satisfied by an admis-
sion which is against the penal interest of the informant, id. at 583, though this aspect of the
holding has been sharply criticized. See Note, Probable Cause and the First-Time Informer, supra
note 7, at 366.
14. Aguilar cited with approval the affidavit in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
The informer in Jones, who had previously furnished reliable information to the police, stated that
he had recently purchased narcotics at the home in question. Id. at 267 n.2. Ideally, the tip
should present the informer's first-hand observations, from which the magistrate can evaluate the
validity of his conclusions. Moylan, supra note 7, at 773.
15. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417. This is often referred to as the "self-verifying detail," and is an
alternative means of satisfying the basis of knowledge prong when the tip fails to set out the
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The Illinois Supreme Court applied the Aguilar-Spinei test in People v.
Gates.16 On May 3, 1978, the police department of Bloomingdale, Illinois,
received an anonymous letter which alleged that two of the town's residents,
Lance and Susan Gates, were drug dealers, and described their alleged modus
operandi for smuggling drugs from Florida.17 Based on the letter's prediction
that the couple would soon be making a trip to Florida, the police checked
airline records and discovered that Lance Gates had booked a ffight to West
Palm Beach, Florida, departing May 5.18 Drug Enforcement Administaration
agents followed Gates upon his arrival in Florida, and reported that he had
gone to a motel room registered to a Susan Gates. The next morning, the
agents observed the couple enter a car bearing a license plate registered to
Lance Gates,19 and saw them drive northbound on "an interstate frequently
used by travelers to the Chicago area."'20
The police presented the anonymous letter and the results of their in-
dependent investigation 2' in an affidavit to a local judge, who issued a search
warrant for the car and the Gateses' residence. Twenty-two hours after their
departure from Florida, the Gateses returned to Bloomingdale. Officers
informer's first-hand observations. See Moylan, supra note 7, at 775. This point is a good illustra-
tion of the independent nature of the Agullar-Spinelli prongs. A detailed tip, though uncorrobo-
rated, provides a sufficient showing of the basis of knowledge, but the veracity of the source also
must be established. Otherwise, a liar could provide probable cause by fabricating a detailed story.
See Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d 847 (1974).
16. 85 Il. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
17. The anonymous letter provided:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly make
their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off
Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue
his wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then
Lance flys [sic] down and drives it back. Sue flys [sic] back after she drops the car off in
Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few
days to drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loadod with
over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $I00,000.00 worth of drugs in their
basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living on
pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are friends
with some big drug dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance & Susan Gates
Greenway
in Condominiums
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325.
18. Apparently, no information was obtained about the travel plans of Susan Gates, proba-
bly because the police received the letter on the same day she was alleged to be driving to Florida.
19. The license plate was not registered to the car the Gateses were driving. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
at 2326. The significance of this fact is unclear. While arguably engendering suspicion, it seems
unlikely that a criminal in taking the trouble to tamper with a license plate would drive a car
bearing a plate registered to him.
20. Id. at 2326. Justice Stevens pointed out the absurdity of this statement in his dissent. Id.
at 2360 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The interstate highway is 1-95, and it is frequently used by
any northbound traveler leaving Florida's east coast.
21. The early investigation revealed that Lance Gates was indeed a resident of Blooming-
dale, Illinois, and the police obtained an address from a confidential informant that was more
recent than the one on Gates' driver's license. Id. at 2325. This informant did not figure into the
probable cause determination. See Comment, supra note 7, at 118 n.179.
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awaiting their arrival searched the car and home, and discovered approxi-
mately 350 pounds of marijuana and other contraband.22
Defendants moved to suppress the seized evidence on the grounds that
the affidavit was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause under the
Aguilar-Spinelli test. The state circuit court upheld the challenge, and the Illi-
nois Supreme Court affirmed.23 The court held that neither prong of Aguilar
had been satisfied.2 4
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 25 In a majority opinion writ-
ten by Justice Rehnquist,26 the Court did not consider whether the lower court
had properly applied the Aguilar-Spinelli test, but instead adopted and applied
a new, less rigorous standard:
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant's
"veracity," "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are all highly rele-
vant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, how-
ever, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate
and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case
.... Rather,. . . they should be understood simply as closely in-
tertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, prac-
tical question whether there is "probable cause" to believe that
contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.27
The Court expressly abandoned the two-pronged test established in Aguilar
22. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
23. People v. Gates, 85 Ill.2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981).
24. Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
25. Many expected the Supreme Court to use the Gates case to modify the exclusionary rule,
which requires suppression of any evidence illegally seized. After hearing oral argument on the
case, the Court requested the parties to brief and argue the additional question of whether the
exclusionary rule should be modified to allow admission of evidence seized in a reasonable belief
that a search was constitutional. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982). In the final decision,
however, the Court, "with apologies to all," decided not to reach this question. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at
2321. The rationale for this decision was that the issue had not been passed upon by the lower
court, and thus was outside the Court's jurisdiction. Id. at 2322. A more practical consideration
that may have influenced the Court's decision was that it did not want to be open to criticism for
having reached out to modify such an important rule.
Justice White reaffirmed his previously-expressed opinion, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
537 (1976) (White, J., dissenting), that the exclusionary rule should be modified to allow admis-
sion of evidence seized pursuant to good faith mistakes. He also contended that the issue was
appropriate for decision in Gates. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2336 (White, J., concurring).
The Court has recently granted certiorari to three cases that may provide appropriate vehicles
for a modification of the rule. See United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.) (unpublished
opinion), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Colorado v. Quintero, - Colo. _ 657 P.2d 948,
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725
(1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983); see also 51 U.S.L.W. 3913, 3914 (U.S. June 28, 1983)
(summarizing issues raised by certiorari petitions in the foregoing cases).
The merit of the exclusionary rule is the most debated issue in criminal procedure today. The
question whether it should be modified, however, is outside the scope of this note.
26. Justice White concurred in the judgment, but wrote a separate opinion. Gates, 103 S. Ct
at 2336 (White, J., concurring). Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall. Id. at 2351
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens filed his own dissent, in which Justice Brennan also
joined. Id. at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. Id at 2327-28.
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and Spinelli in favor of this "totality of the circumstances" approach.78 The
new test requires the magistrate "to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, in-
cluding the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place." 29
The Court offered a number of reasons for abandoning the Aguilar-
Spinelli test. First, the Court noted that the totality of the circumstances ap-
proach was more consistent with the traditional concept of probable cause,30
citing from prior decisions language that probable cause is a "practical, non-
technical concept," 3' and that "technical requirements of elaborate specificity
once exacted under common law pleading have no proper place in this
area."32 Because the Auilar-Spine//i analysis required that two independent
tests be satisfied before probable cause could be found, the Court felt that it
was incompatible with the traditional interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment's requirements.33 While preserving the informant's veracity and basis of
knowledge as relevant considerations, 34 the Court stated that independent sat-
isfaction of both prongs was unnecessary; "a deficiency in one may be com-
pensated for. . . by a strong showing as to the other." 3
5
As further support for the totality of the circumstances approach, the
Court noted that affidavits in support of warrants normally are drafted by lay-
men, and that search warrants often are issued by persons with no formal legal
training.36 The Court concluded that the "rigorous inquiry" required by the
Aguilar-Spinelli test was incompatible with the significant role of laymen in
probable cause determinations.37 The Court also feared that overly-rigid scru-
tiny of police affidavits might encourage warrantless searches.38 Finally, the
Court reasoned that Aguilar-Spinelli should be abandoned because the "stric-
tures" of the two-pronged test were unduly impeding the task of law enforce-
ment officers.3 9
28. Id. at 2332. Such an approach had been expressly disapproved in Spinelli, 393 U.S. at
415.
29. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
30. Id. at 2328.
31. Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
32. Id at 2330 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).
33. Id. at 2329.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2330. The Court stated that these laymen "certainly do not remain abreast of each
judicial refinement of the nature of 'probable cause.'" This assertion is a bit troubling, given the
importance of the magistrate in the search and seizure process. See supra note 9. While the
magistrate's status as a laymen certainly mitigates in favor of a probable cause test that is easy to
apply, requiring him to stay informed about the current state of the law he is sworn to uphold
would seem to be a reasonable condition of employment.
37. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330-31.
38. Id. at 2331. Justice Brennan disputed this contention, emphasizing the principle that
warrantless searches are, as a general rule, unreasonable, subject to a few "jealously and carefully
drawn" exceptions. Id. at 2358 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 2331-32. The Court based this conclusion on a belief that anonymous tips could
seldom pass the two-pronged test. Id. This assertion is somewhat misleading. See id. at 2356
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Justice Brennan, in dissent, severely criticized the Court's decision to
abandon theAguilar-Spinelli rules. Justice Brennan disagreed with the major-
ity's assertion that the test was inconsistent with the Court's prior treatment of
probable cause.40 He characterized the test as a necessary instrument "to in-
sure that findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, are based on
information provided by an honest or credible person who has acquired [his]
information in a reliable way."4 1 Justice Brennan went on to argue:
The Court's complete failure to provide any persuasive reason
for rejecting Aguilar and Spinelli doubtlessly reflects impatience with
what it perceives to be "overly technical" rules governing searches
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Words such as "practi-
cal," "non-technical," and "commonsense," as used in the Court's
opinion, are but code words for an overly permissive attitude to-
wards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the
Fourth Amendment.42
Justice White, concurring, took a middle position. While agreeing with
the majority that the lower court's holding should be reversed, Justice White
based his conclusion on a belief that the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements had
been satisfied.43 Police corroboration of the tip, according to Justice White,
was sufficient to enable the magistrate to conclude both that the anonymous
informant was credible and that he had obtained his information in a reliable
way.44 His ability to predict in advance the "unusual"4 5 travel plans of the
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Although, as the Court observed, the veracity of anonymous informers
is "largely unknown, and unknowable," veracity may be established by independent corrobora-
tion of details in the tip. See supra note 12. Basis of knowledge may be established by sufficient
details in the tip, see supra note 15, or by corroborating enough details to allow the magistrate to
conclude that the informer had an adequate basis for his knowledge. See supra note 12. Finally,
the tip, insufficient on its face, may lead the police to facts that provide probable cause standing
alone, thus avoiding the need to apply Aguilar-Spinelli.
The Court's statement that the Aguilar-Spinelli standard leaves no room for "anonymous
citizen informants" is also misleading. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. By definition, there is no way of
knowing whether an anonymous tip that fails Aguilar's test came from an honest citizen or a
person bent on harassment. See Comment, supra note 7, at 107 (arguing that tips from anony-
mous informants are presumptively unreliable).
40. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 2347 (White, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 2349 (White, J., concurring).
45. Id. While the peregrinations of the Gateses were certainly unusual, the details known to
the police at the time they applied for the warrant could hardly be characterized as such. At the
time the warrant issued, the police knew that: (I) a man had flown to Florida; (2) had spent the
night in a motel room registered in his wife's name; and (3) had driven northbound the next
morning. If they had also known that Sue Gates had driven 22 hours to Florida two days before
her husband's arrival, and that the northbound morning drive would end 22 hours later in Bloom-
ingdale, suspicion would have been justified.
This factual shortcoming formed the basis of Justice Stevens' dissent. Noting that "subse-
quent events may not be considered in evaluating [a] warrant," id. at 2361 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
and that the tip had been mistaken in part (the tip had predicted that Sue Gates would return to
Illinois before her husband flew to Florida, raising the inference that the Gateses did not want to
leave their home unguarded), Justice Stevens argued that the search of the house was not sup-
ported by probable cause. He urged a remand to consider whether the search of the car could be
justified as a valid warrantless search.
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Gateses suggested that the informant had a reliable basis for his knowledge.4 6
Because he believed that Aguilar-Spinelli had been satisfied, Justice White
concurred in the Court's result.47
Justice White did not, however, join the majority in overruling Aguilar
and Spinelli because he feared that "the Court's holding may foretell an evis-
ceration of the probable cause standard. '4 8 He stated that the Aguilar-Spinelli
analysis plays a proper role in probable cause determinations, and that any
probable cause test should expressly require a satisfactory showing on each
independent prong.49 Justice White admitted that many lower courts had
been applying Aguilar and Spinelli in an overly technical manner, but urged
that a clarification of the cases, not a new standard, was the proper remedy for
this problem.50 He contended that the Court should give more guidance to an
issuing magistrate than simply an instruction to use his common sense, and
thus concluded that the majority's totality of the circumstances test was an ill-
advised abdication of the Court's responsibility in the probable cause area.51
The distinctions between the probable cause inquiry required by Gates
and that previously mandated by Aguilar-Spinelli are subtle. While Aguilar-
Spinelli required that an informant's veracity and his basis of knowledge be
established before probable cause could be found, Gates instructs the magis-
trate to consider the totality of the circumstances presented to him in deciding
whether a warrant should issue.52 Gates, however, reaffirms that the inform-
ant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are all "highly relevant" in
weighing the value of his report.5 3 The important difference between.Aguilar-
Spinelli and Gates is that Gates does not require separate, independent show-
ings on each prong before probable cause may be found.54 Under Gates, a
46. Ironically, Justice White's concurrence clarified what had been a very uncertain issue
under Aguilar-Spinelli---the effect of police corroboration. Some commentators had read Spinelli
to mean that corroboration of facts in a deficient tip may establish the veracity of the informant,
but never his basis of knowledge. See Comment, supra note 7, at 105; see also Gates, 103 S. Ct. at
2355 (Breanan, J., dissenting). Others had argued that only corroboration of incriminating, rather
than innocent, details should be relevant. See Rebell, supra note 7, at 716-17; Note, The In-
former's Tip as Probable Cause for Search or Arrest, supra note 7, at 967. Justice White pointed
out that while corroboration will generally only go to the reliability of the informer, see supra note
12, it sometimes will give rise to the inference that the informer had an adequate basis for his
information. In Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), for instance, an informer was able
to provide a detailed description of a suspect and the clothes he would be wearing two days before
that person's arrival in Denver by train. In that case the Court concluded that the informant had
an adequate basis for his assertion that the suspect would be carrying heroin. Detailed informa-
tion of the type provided by the informant in the Draper case is not ordinarily a matter of com-
mon knowledge, but must have come from reliable inside knowledge. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2348-49
(White, J., concurring). Rather than focusing on whether corroborated facts are "innocent' or
"incriminating," it is more useful to ask whether the facts are of a type not easily ascertained, thus
suggesting an adequate basis of knowledge. See United States v. Montgomery, 554 F.2d 754 (5th
Cir. 1977) (crucial facts are those that reveal "personal pipeline" to the criminal scheme).
47. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2349-50 (White, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
49. Id. (White, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 2350-51 (White, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2351 (White, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 2332.
53. Id. at 2327.
54. Id. at 2327-28.
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deficient showing on one prong now may be remedied by an unusually strong
showing on the other, as part of the totality of the circumstances analysis 55
This modification, though slight, has potentially undesirable consequences.
The Supreme Court adopted the Aguilar test to deal with a specific prob-
lem-the proper role of hearsay in probable cause determinations.5 6 The test
was formulated to allow trustworthy hearsay to be considered. The veracity
and basis of knowledge requirements were devised to ensure that only hearsay
which rose to a certain minimum level of trustworthiness would provide the
basis for a search warrant.5 7 Only if kept analytically distinct do the two
prongs perform their intended function.58
The abandonment of the requirement that both of Aguilar's prongs be
satisfied, though a subtle modification, increases the probability that untrust-
worthy hearsay will provide the basis for a search. The Court stated that an
explicit and detailed tip accompanied by a statement that criminal activity was
observed in person is entitled to greater weight, regardless of any showing of
the informant's veracity.59 But such a detailed statement, which represents a
more than adequate showing of the informer's basis of knowledge, does not
make it any more probable that the person is telling the truth.60 A liar may
concoct a story alleging first-hand observation as easily as he may concoct
bald accusations. 61 The increased detail does not reduce the possibility that
the informer may be lying, yet under Gates, it may well be held sufficient for a
warrant to issue.
Likewise, the Gates majority exhibited flawed reasoning when it sug-
55. Id. at 2329. This change is the essence of the totality of the circumstances approach.
Deficiencies may also be compensated for by the "other indicia of reliability." Id.
56. The Supreme Court first formally considered the question of hearsay as the basis for a
warrant only four years prior to.gzilar, in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones
the Court held that hearsay could be the basis for a warrant as long as the magistrate had a
"substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay. Id. at 269. Some have viewed Jones as conflicting
with Agullar, and have read the "substantial basis for crediting" language as a less restrictive
alternative to Aguilar's two-pronged test. See Moylan, supra note 7, at 781. The better view is
that the Agullar test defines what constitutes a "substantial basis." Since Aguilar cited Jones with
approval, see supra note 14, it is more logical to readAguilar as an extension of Jones, rather than
as a rejection of it. Moylan, supra note 7, at 781.
57. See supra notes 8-9 for the historical origins of the two prongs.
58. For an excellent discussion of the distinct functions of the twoAguilar-Spinelli prongs, see
Moylan, supra note 7, at 750-52.
59. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2329-30. This "greater weight" might be enough to justify a probable
cause finding under the new totality of the circumstances test, notwithstanding the remaining
doubts about the informant's veracity.
60. If the person were known to the police, and presented a detailed statement of criminal
activity, then it could be argued that he probably would not be fabricating such a story. The
Court has recognized that a statement given under circumstances that would subject the source to
criminal liability if false is presumed to be reliable. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
Typically, however, an informer of unknown veracity is not known to the police; otherwise, his
veracity would have been established by his prior track record or by the citizen-informer excep-
tion, see supra notes 11, 13 and accompanying text. Because such an anonymous source could be
fabricating a detailed story for a variety of reasons, some showing of credibility or reliability
should be required. UnderAguilar-Spinelli his reliability could be established by corroboration of
details of the tip.
61. See Moylan, supra note 7, at 781; see also, Note, Probable Cause and the First-Time In-
former, supra note 7.
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gested that, if an informer is known for his unusual reliability, his tip is enti-
tled to more weight, and deficiencies in his basis of knowledge may be
overlooked.62 The Court's statement has some logical appeal, for if a person is
reputable and credible, it is more likely that he has a reliable basis for his
accusations. But Justices White and Brennan both identified the flaw in this
reasoning: the Court has consistently held that a police officer, known to be
credible and honest, must still present to the magistrate the basis of his knowl-
edge.63 This requirement is essential to the magistrate's role as a neutral arbi-
ter in the warrant process. In the words of Justice White, "it would be
'quixotic' if a. . .statement from an honest informant, but not one from an
honest officer, could furnish probable cause." 64 This result is possible, how-
ever, under the test announced in Gates.
The Court justified abandoning the Aguilar-Sinelli test by emphasizing
the need for flexibility and practicality in probable cause determinations. 65
The Court argued that the two-pronged test was rigid and technical, that any
such test was incompatible with traditional notions of probable cause, and that
therefore the test should be abandoned. 66 This emphasis on traditional no-
tions of probable cause is misleading. Aguilar and Spinelli address a special
probable cause problem-probable cause based on hearsay information. 67
Because informers' tips are inherently more uncertain than information from
an officer, a somewhat more rigorous test is needed to ensure that untrustwor-
thy information does not provide the basis for a search warrant. For this rea-
62. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2329. As in the case of the detailed tip of questionable veracity, this
added weight may justify a probable cause finding under the new test, despite the incomplete
showing of the informer's basis of knowledge.
63. Id at 2350 (White, J., concurring); id at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The basis of
knowledge requirement is thus a procedural safeguard; it does not relate to the truthfulness of the
source. No matter how credible the informer, the raw data on which he has based his conclusions
must be presented, so that the neutral magistrate may evaluate the validity of those conclusions.
See supra note 9.
64. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring). As Justice White observed, it is doubtful
that the Court intended this illogical result. Id. The majority opinion expressly reaffirmed the
holdings of 4guilar and Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), that a wholly conclusory
statement cannot be the basis for a probable cause finding. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. Justice
White noted that the majority limited these decisions to affidavits involving "bare conclusions,"
and expressed concern that if an affidavit contained anything more, it would be left only to the
magistrate's common sense to determine whether a warrant should issue. Id. at 2350 (White, J.,
concurring).
Another potential problem is the misreading of Gates by lower courts. If the general lan-
guage allowing compensation for deficiencies by a strong showing on one prong is not read in
conjunction with the interdiction of conclusory statements, it is possible that an affidavit contain-
ing no information about the basis of the informer's knowledge could be held sufficient. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kolodziej, 712 F.2d 975, 977 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Absent some of the underlying
facts from which the informant concluded that criminal activity had taken place, a finding of
probable cause is nonetheless warranted under Gates if a strong showing regarding the inform-
ant's reliability is made."). A literal application of this statement as 'the rule of Gates' would lead
to the quixotic result feared by Justice White.
65. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328.
66. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
67. It is important to keep in mind that the Court, in formulating the test in Aguilar, drew
heavily upon "traditional" principles in the probable cause field. See supra notes 8-9.
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son, the probable cause inquiry required when information from an informer
is presented differs from that required in a more traditional context.
Justice Brennan argued in dissent that.Aguilar and Spinelli are consistent
with the principle that probable cause is a "practical, nontechnical" concept.68
This point is valid, but is often lost in discussions of "spurs" or "self-verifying
details."' 69 The technical vocabulary used in connection with the Aguilar-
Spinelli prongs belies the underlying simplicity of the test. The magistrate is
required to ask two simple questions. First, he must ask, "Why should infor-
mation from this informant be believed?"-the veracity prong.70 Second, he
must ask, "Has the informant obtained his information in a reliable way?"-
the basis of knowledge prong.7' The second test should be especially easy for
the magistrate to apply because it is the same test that is applied to an affidavit
that does not contain hearsay. 72 The first prong should also be easily applied
by the magistrate, for most often the informer's credibility will have been es-
tablished by his prior experiences with the police or by independent police
investigation.73 The more difficult cases are those similar to Spinelli, in which
a tip that alone would be insufficient is presented to the magistrate along with
some police corroboration. The different ways in which each prong can be
satisfied have been well established, however, and the magistrate need only
examine the affidavit to determine whether the given case satisfies any of these
alternative tests.74 With proper guidelines the magistrate should be fully able
to apply the Aguilar-Spinelli test in an efficient manner.75
68. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2357-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that under
Aguilar and Spinelli magistrates were free to apply a practical, commnonsense conception of prob-
able cause if they had first determined that the information before them had been obtained in a
reliable way by a credible person. Id.
69. See supra note 8 for discussion of "spurs" and supra note 15 for discussion of the "self-
verifying detail." The Court referred to the Agular-Spineili rules as a "labyrinthine body ofjudi-
cial refinement," Id at 2333, and some of the majority's discussions of these rules border on the
sarcastic, see, e.g., id. at 2327 n.4. While a good deal of technical-sounding language has devel-
oped in connection with the test, see, e.g., Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 313 A.2d 847, cert.
denied, 271 Md. 745 (1974), most of the concepts involved are not as intimidating as the terms that
describe them. For instance, the reliability and credibility spurs of the veracity prong stand for the
proposition that an informer's veracity may be established either by his prior record (credibility)
or by evidence that tends to show that the tip involved a particular case should be believed (relia-
bility). See Moylan, supra note 7, at 754.
70. See Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Causefor Search or Arrest, supra note 7, at 960.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 9. This test is better understood as a general requirement, applicable to all
warrants, that the information on which conclusions are based must be presented to the magis-
trate. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2356 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The magistrate is required to
examine the officer's affidavit to determine whether the officer's information supports his
conclusions.
73. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. The magistrate could easily use a check-
list-type analysis in applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test. For instance, he could ask:
(1) Does the tip clearly reveal the basis of the informer's conclusion (e.g., a statement alleging
first-hand observation of criminal activity)?
(2) If not, does the tip contain detail sufficient to permit the inference that the informer must
have a reliable basis for his conclusions?
(3) If not, do the corroborated details of the tip permit such an inference?
75. Justices Rehnquist and Brennan expressed strongly differing views regarding formal, ju-
dicial guidelines such as theAguilar-Spineili test. Justice Relmquist believed that a mandatory test
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The Court's argument that the Aguilar-Spinelli test unduly impedes the
task of law enforcement officers76 is also questionable. The information re-
quired by Aguilar-Spinelli is information that should be the subject of police
inquiry even if there were no test.77 The two prongs are not technicalities that
have no connection to routine investigatory work. The veracity prong merely
requires the officer to set forth the answer to a question that he should have
asked of himself upon receiving a tip: Why should this person be believed? If
the question cannot be answered satisfactorily, the officer should not be
presenting the tip as grounds for a warrant. With respect to the basis of
knowledge prong, the officer presumably knows that his own conclusory alle-
gations will be insufficient to support a warrant.78 It should not be overly
burdensome, therefore, to require him to inquire into the informer's basis of
knowledge. The Court argued that most informers "generally do not provide
extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations." 79 This argu-
ment is not compelling, however, for as Justice Brennan observed, it ignores
the possibility that the officer, cognizant of the importance of basis of knowl-
edge to the constitutional role of the magistrate, can elicit this information
from the informant, with whom he usually will be in verbal contact.80 For
instance, if officer A receives a tip from B, a regular police informer, that X
has cocaine in his house, he need only ask B, "How do you know this?" Most
often, this simple question will result in a statement that B has witnessed a sale
at the residence, or that he has personally purchased drugs from X. Requiring
the officer to make this inquiry is not a useless technicality, for the question
eliminates the possibility that B has based his conclusion on a "casual rumor
circulating in the underworld." 81
When an anonymous tip is involved, the basis of knowledge requirement
is more difficult to satisfy because the officer usually does not have the oppor-
tunity to question further the person supplying information.8 2 The majority
focused on this instance in illustrating how the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements
restricted the magistrate in the exercise of his constitutional function, and that a formal test was
inappropriate for laymen to apply. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330, 2333. Justice Brennan took the
opposing view that a formal test helps the layman by structuring the probable cause inquiry, and
reinforces the constitutional role of the magistrate by requiring certain information to be
presented to him. Id. at 2355, 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 2331; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
77. The court's comments in Gonzales v. Beto, 425 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1970), are instructive:
It is not the intent of the Aguilar and Spinelli decisions to make it difficult for a
policeman to get a warrant .f in fact he has probable cause. On the contrary, the cases
contemplate that an affiant with some basic understanding of the law can get a warrant if
he has probable cause and simply sits down and explains why.
Id. at 970.
78, See Moylan, supra note 7, at 751.
79. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2331.
80. Id. at 2356 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416.
82. While this is usually the case, sometimes the police will have the opportunity to elicit
additional information from an informer despite his anonymity. See United States v. Bush, 647
F.2d 357, 359-60 (3d Cir. 1981) (anonymous tip provided by series of phone calls to DEA agents).
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unduly impeded police officers.83 If an anonymous letter contains only
sketchy details supporting the informer's assertion that criminal evidence ex-
ists in a certain location, however, a strong argument may be made that, given
the uncertainty of the source, the law enforcement process should be impeded
at this point.84 The tip will still be of use to the police, for even if it cannot
satisfy Aguilar-Spinelli and provide probable cause by itself, it may trigger a
police investigation that will uncover evidence sufficient to constitute probable
cause.85 With the alternative of further investigation, subjecting anonymous
tips to the Aguilar-Spinelli test imposes only a minimal burden on the law
enforcement process, and also protects citizens from intrusions based on less-
than-reliable information.
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, correctly observed that even if
some courts were applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test in an overly technical man-
ner, it was not necessary to abandon the test to correct such undesirable re-
suits.8 6 People v. Palanza,87 cited by the majority as an example of the
excessive technicality of Aguilar-Spine/li, illustrates Justice White's point. In
Palanza the affidavit in question contained a statement by an informer of
proven reliability that he had observed a white crystalline substance, which
appeared to him to be cocaine, inside the defendant's residence.8 8 The court
held that the basis of knowledge prong had not been satisfied, and thus held
the search unconstitutional underAdguilar-Spine/li. While the result in Palanza
is undesirable, the case provides no basis for criticizing the Aguilar-Spinelli
test, because the Palanza court applied the test incorrectly. 89 The allegation of
first-hand observation is the best way to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong,
and the informer's statement clearly was sufficient.90 The lesson to be drawn
from Palanza and other similar cases is that theAguilar-Spinelli test should not
83. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2331-32.
84. Justice Brennan noted that when a warrant is sought solely on the basis of an anonymous
tip, the police have satisfied the procedural function ofAguilar-Spinelli, as they have presented to
the magistrate all the information on which they are acting. Brennan felt, however, that the test
served the additional function of guarding against probable cause findings based on untrustwor-
thy information. Id at 2356 n.6. His argument is even stronger if one accepts the premise that
anonymous tips are presumptively unreliable. See Comment, supra note 7, at 107.
85. The facts of Gates best illustrate this point. Even if the request for a warrant based on the
tip had been denied, the police would have been alerted to the Gateses as drug suspects. Accord-
ing to the anonymous source, the Gateses were conducting a substantial narcotics business using
their house as a base. Surely police surveillance would have uncovered evidence suspicious
enough to warrant a probable cause finding without reference to the initial tip. Delaying the
search in cases like Gates, in which ongoing criminal conduct is alleged, until independent investi-
gation has been made, would impose a small burden on the law enforcement process, yet greatly
reduce the chances of an unconstitutional violation of a citizen's fourth amendment rights.
86. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350-51 (White, J., concurring). As evidence of the test's shortcom-
ings, the majority cited three state court opinions in which affidavits were found defective under
Aguilar-Spinelt. Id. at 2330 n.9.
87. 55 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 371 N.E.2d 687 (1978).
88. Id. at 1029, 371 N.E.2d at 688.
89. The other two cases cited by the Court, Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974), and People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29,482 P.2d 369 (1971), also involved incorrect applica-
tions of the test. The cases do not reveal a problem with the Aguilar-Spinelli test, but rather with
the court applying the test.
90. The affidavit in Palanza was quite similar to the one in Jones, which was cited in Aguilar
as an example of how the prongs could be satisfied. See supra notes 14, 56.
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be applied in an overly technical manner, not that the test itself is defective.9 1
The Court could have remedied the problems illustrated by Palanza without
resort to the totality of the circumstances standard.92
Justice White also argued that a clarification of Aguilar-Spinelli would
have been preferable to abandoning the test.93 His argument is persuasive,
because much of the confusion that had arisen surrounding theAguilar-Spinelli
test was traceable to the confusing majority opinion in Spineli.94 The area of
greatest uncertainty under Spineli was the effect of police corroboration on a
tip insufficient on its face.95 Justice White's concurring opinion in Gates pro-
vided the necessary clarification by detailing the effect of corroborative evi-
dence on each prong of theAguilar-Spinelli test.96 Adoption of his suggestions
would have eliminated many of the problems that magistrates and lower
courts were encountering in applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test,97 and also
would have avoided the potentially undesirable consequences of the new total-
ity of the circumstances standard.98
The new test announced in Gates undoubtedly will lead to a looser prob-
able cause standard. Magistrates and lower courts likely will continue to eval-
uate informer tips by examining the veracity and basis of knowledge of the
informer, both because they are accustomed to applying such an analysis and
because Gates expressly reaffirms the relevance of these factors in the probable
91. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). In Ventresca the Supreme Court
reversed an appellate court's holding that a lengthy affidavit describing defendant's alleged opera-
tion of an illegal distillery was deficient under Aguilar because it did not clearly reveal how all of
the information in the affidavit (most of which came from government investigators) had been
obtained. The Court felt that the lower court's reading of the affidavit was too technical, and
upheld the search. Despite cautioning against "technical requirements of elaborate specificity,"
id. at 108, the Ventresca court reaffirmed the requirement that both Aguilar prongs be satisfied.
Justice Goldberg, author of the Aguilar opinion, also wrote for the Court in Ventresca, and it is
unlikely that he intended his Ventresca opinion, which followed Aguilar by only one year, to
conflict with the prior holding. Ventresca stood for the proposition that magistrates must take a
commonsense approach in deciding whether Aguilar's prongs have been satisfied, not that they
may disregard the prongs entirely. 1d at 108-09.
92. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350 n.26 (White, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 2350-51 (White, J., concurring).
94. While Spine/li was fairly clear in stating the general principle that a tip, when considered
along with other supporting evidence, must be as reliable as one that would pass Aguilar's test
standing alone, see supra text accompanying note 10, the opinion was quite confusing in its at-
tempt to outline exactly how this principle should be applied. Justice Brennan stated in Gates that
the Court's opinion in Spinelli was "not a model of clarity." Brennan, like many others, looked to
Justice White's concurring opinion in Spinelli for a proper explanation of the holding. See, e.g.,
LaFave, supra note 7, at 7 n.28; Moylan, supra note 7, at 773; Comment, supra note 7, at 104. The
uncertainties inherent in Spinelli led many lower courts to confuse the two prongs of the test and
the ways in which each could be satisfied. See Moylan, supra note 7, at 779-81.
95. For a discussion of the rules of corroborating evidence, see LaFave, supra note 7, at 49-
67. Most of the confusion centered on when corroboration could be used to satisfy either prong,
and what type of corroborative evidence would suffice. See supra note 46.
96. See supra note 46.
97. Justice White acknowledged the possibility that lower courts would be unable to apply
theAguilar-Spinelli analysis properly even after a clarification by the Court. He felt, however, that
any abandonment of Aguilar and Spinelli should have been postponed until the cases had first
been clarified. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350-51 (White, J., concurring).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
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cause determination.9 9 Any tip that would have satisfied Aguilar-Spinelli thus
will also satisfy the new test. More tips, however, will be found sufficient
under Gates than under Aguilar-Spinelli because the magistrate will be free to
overlook a deficient showing on one of the prongs in his consideration of the
totality of the circumstances presented to him. By loosening the probable
cause standard, the Court indirectly decreased the importance of the exclu-
sionary rule,'0 0 a modification that it had been unwilling to make directly.' 0'
If fewer searches are found unconstitutional because the test applied to sup-
porting affidavits is less stringent, the remedy of exclusion will be triggered less
often.
The primary flaw in the Supreme Court's decision in Gates is that the
Court need not have taken the action it did to achieve the result it desired.
The Court properly was concerned with eliminating some of the confusion
that had arisen surrounding the Aguilar-Spinelli test in order to simplify the
warrant process and preclude unduly strict applications of the test. The new
totality of the circumstances standard certainly achieves these goals, but by
abandoning the strict two-pronged requirements of Aguilar-Spinelli it also
loosens the probable cause standard. A clarification ofAguilar and Spinelli, as
urged by Justice White, would have remedied the same problems that Gates
sought to remedy, and also would have avoided the possible undesirable con-
sequences of the new test. Justice White feared that the Gates holding might
lead to "an evisceration of the probable cause standard.' ' l) 2 Whether this
drastic result will follow remains to be seen. What is certain after Gates, how-
ever, is the increased probability that intrusions into the privacy of private
citizens will be authorized on less-than-reliable information.
DAVID THOMAS GRUDBERG
99. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2327.
100. While not all probable cause cases involve information from informers, one commentator
has noted that .4guilar-Spinelli cases constitute "the bulk of probable cause law." See 8B J.
MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 41.04, at 43 (2d ed. 1983). The looser probable cause
standard adopted in Gates thus will reduce significantly the number of cases invoking the exclu-
sionary rule.
101. See supra note 25.
102. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
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